The Strength of Weak Commitments: A Theory of Price Preannouncements
Published in Management Science, 2026
Recommended citation: Li, X., & Xiong, Y. (2026). "The Strength of Weak Commitments: A Theory of Price Preannouncements." Management Science, 72(2), 1054–1071. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02020 https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02020
This paper argues that price preannouncements can serve as a weak price commitment that helps manufacturers secure better deals from their retailers, offering a new theory of price preannouncements in marketing channels.
Recommended citation: Li, X., & Xiong, Y. (2026). “The Strength of Weak Commitments: A Theory of Price Preannouncements.” Management Science, 72(2), 1054–1071. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02020